SKETCH

OF A

PROPOSAL FOR COLONIZING

AUSTRALASIA,

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It is proposed,

I. That all land now granted, and to be granted, throughout the Australasian Settlements, be declared liable to a tax of 10 per cent. upon the actual rent.

II. That a payment in money of 2l. per acre be required for all future grants without exception.
III. That the proceeds of the tax upon rent, and of sales, form an Emigration Fund, to be employed in the conveyance of British Labourers to the Colony, free of cost.

IV. That those, to whom the administration of the Fund shall be entrusted, be empowered to raise money thereon, as money is raised on Parish and County Rates in England.

V. That the supply of Labourers be exactly proportioned to the demand for labour at each Settlement; so that no Capitalist shall ever want Labourers, and no Labourer shall ever want employment.

VI. That, in the selection of Emigrants, an absolute preference be given to equal
numbers of both sexes, and to persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four.

VII. That every person, reaching a Settlement at his own expense, or providing a passage for others, be entitled to a grant of land, at the rate of acres for himself, and for each person by him conveyed to the Settlement.

VIII. That every person, reaching a Settlement at his own expense, or providing a passage for others, have the option to receive, either a grant of land, as by Article VII., or a payment in money from the Emigration Fund, at the rate of 2l. per acre for the quantity of land to which he should be entitled.
IX. That grants be absolute in fee, without any condition whatsoever, and obtainable by deputy.

X. That any surplus of the proceeds of the tax upon rent, and of sales, over what is required for Emigration, be employed in relief of other taxes, and for the general purposes of Colonial Government.
EXPLANATORY REMARKS.

ARTICLE 1.

That all land now granted, and to be granted, throughout the Australasian Settlements, be declared liable to a tax of 10 per cent. upon the actual rent.

This is not a land-tax, but a tax upon rent. The amount of the tax would be determined, either by the actual receipt of rent, or by the estimated letting value of land when occupied by the landlord; and the machinery for collecting the tax would be the same as that by which county rates are levied in England.

The highest rent accrues, it is established, when the number of people is so great as to require that the worst land should be cultivated. Rent, therefore, depends entirely upon population.

In all modern colonies the people have been very few in proportion to appropriated land; and land, consequently, has yielded little or no rent. The amount of rent yielded by land in New Colonies appears to have been governed by the terms on which waste land
could be obtained. Where grants have been made with great profusion, as if land were of no value, no rent at all has been obtained for it, until, after a long time, the people had increased so as to counteract the profusion of the Crown. Where land has been sparingly, or rather wisely, granted, some rent has accrued almost immediately, and it has rapidly increased. In no modern Colony, as far as I can learn, has the Crown granted land with so little profusion as in New South Wales; and land in New South Wales bears, I believe, a higher rent than was ever obtained in any modern colony of the same age. I ought rather to say, that this was the case, both as to grants and as to rent; for, lately, a single grant of land in New South Wales exceeded in quantity the whole extent of previous grants during forty years, and I am not aware of the effect which that profuse measure may have had on the rent of land generally. In 1821, the total extent of land granted in New South Wales was 381,466 acres; the average estimated rent about one shilling per acre. If the proposed measure had then been applied to that settlement, the tax upon rent would at once have produced 1906/. per annum. Money borrowed at five per cent. upon that security would have been 38,146/. That sum would, at 20/., for the passage of each person, have added 851 young couples to the population. As, probably, 851 young couples would have been equal to half the number of young couples in the colony, the increase of popu-
lation occasioned by their arrival would, in proportion to the increase which could have taken place without their arrival, have been very great; and their immigration would have occasioned a proportionate rise in the rent of land. Consequently, the tax upon rent, employed in emigration, would have been, not a loss, but a considerable gain, to the owners of land.

The proposed tax upon rent would, no doubt, take so much from every Land-owner; but it would bestow upon him twice, perhaps three times, as much as it would take from him—perhaps a great deal more. To decide how much, the probable effects of that tax must be estimated in conjunction with the other measures.

ARTICLE II.

That a payment in money of 2l. per acre, be required for all future grants without exception.

The only objection to this part of the measure seems to be, that, as hitherto land has been attainable in the Colonies almost without any payment, the imposition of a comparatively high price on waste land would operate as a check to colonization. If that objection can be maintained, the proposed measure is ridiculous; for one of its main objects is to cause the utmost possible increase of colonization.
By colonization I mean the cultivation of waste land, not its misappropriation and neglect, which, more or less, have been the attributes of all modern Colonies. The prosperity of a Colony signifies, not merely its extent, but also the wealth of its inhabitants; and the progress of colonization depends not merely on the number of acres granted, but also on the quantity of production which occurs, and upon the degree in which production exceeds consumption, that is, upon the accumulation of wealth.

The following passage is extracted from Adam Smith's "Inquiry into the Causes of the Prosperity of New Colonies."

'The colony of a civilized nation which takes possession, either of a waste country, or of one so thinly inhabited, that the natives easily give place to the new settlers, advances more rapidly to wealth and greatness than any other human society.

'The colonists carry out with them a knowledge of agriculture and of other useful arts, superior to what can grow up of its own accord in the course of many centuries among savage and barbarous nations. They carry out with them too the habit of subordination, some notion of the regular government which takes place in their own country, of the system of laws which support it, and of a regular administration of justice; and they naturally establish something of the same kind in the new settlement. But among savage and barbarous nations, the natural progress of law and government is still
'slower than the natural progress of arts, after law
and government have been so far established, as is
necessary for their protection. Every colonist gets
more land than he can possibly cultivate. He has
no rent, and scarce any taxes to pay. No landlord
shares with him in its produce, and the share of the
sovereign is commonly but a trifle. He has every
motive to render as great as possible a produce,
which is thus to be almost entirely his own. But
his land is commonly so extensive, that with all his
own industry, and with all the industry of other
people whom he can get to employ, he can seldom
make it produce the tenth part of what it is capable
of producing. He is eager, therefore, to collect
labourers from all quarters, and to reward them
with the most liberal wages. But those liberal
wages, joined to the plenty and cheapness of land,
soon make those labourers leave him, in order to
become landlords themselves, and to reward, with
equal liberality, other labourers, who soon leave
them for the same reason that they left their first
master. The liberal reward of labour encourages
marriage. The children, during the tender years
of infancy, are well fed and properly taken care of,
and when they are grown up, the value of their
labour greatly overpays their maintenance. When
arrived at maturity, the high price of labour, and
the low price of land, enable them to establish them-
selves in the same manner as their fathers did be-
fore them.
In other countries, rent and profit eat up wages, and the two superior orders of people oppress the inferior one. But in new colonies, the interest of the two superior orders obliges them to treat the inferior one with more generosity and humanity; at least, where that inferior one is not in a state of slavery. Waste lands, of the greatest natural fertility, are to be had for a trifle. The increase of revenue which the proprietor, who is always the undertaker, expects from their improvement, constitutes his profit; which in these circumstances is commonly very great. But this great profit cannot be made without employing the labour of other people in clearing and cultivating the land; and the disproportion between the great extent of the land and the small number of the people, which commonly takes place in new colonies, makes it difficult for him to get this labour. He does not, therefore, dispute about wages, but is willing to employ labour at any price. The high wages of labour encourage population. The cheapness and plenty of good land encourage improvement, and enable the proprietor to pay those high wages. In those wages consists almost the whole price of the land; and though they are high, considered as the wages of labour, they are low, considered as the price of what is so very valuable. What encourages the progress of population and improvement, encourages that of real wealth and greatness.

The progress of many of the ancient Greek colo-
'nies towards wealth and greatness, seems accordingly to have been very rapid. In the course of a century or two, several of them appear to have rivalled, and even to have surpassed their mother cities. Syracuse and Agrigentum in Sicily, Tar- rentum and Locri in Italy, Ephesus and Miletus in Lesser Asia, appear by all accounts to have been at least equal to any of the cities of ancient Greece. Though posterior in their establishment, yet all the arts of refinement, philosophy, poetry, and eloquence, seem to have been cultivated as early, and to have been improved as highly in them, as in any part of the mother country.

'All those Colonies had established themselves in countries inhabited by savage and barbarous nations, who easily gave place to the new settlers. They had plenty of good land, and as they werealtogether independent of the mother city, they were at liberty to manage their own affairs in the way that they judged was most suitable to their own interests.'

In the above passage, of which the object is to account for the very rapid acquisition of wealth by Emigrants from the states of Greece, five main causes are stated,—knowledge of agriculture and other useful arts; freedom from taxes; independence from the beginning; cheapness of land; and dearness of labour. The statement, when examined, will appear very objectionable, both in fact and in reason-
ing. The Emigrants from Greece did not obtain immense tracts of waste land over which they and their children might spread at will. There is not, I believe, an instance of their having advanced far into the interior of any country. Wherever they landed they had to displace warlike tribes, who, abandoning the sea coast after a struggle, continued to watch the intruders and to confine them within very narrow limits. The first occupation of a Greek colony seems to have been to erect a fortress, into which the whole body of colonists might retire in case of need. Some of these strong places became, in a very short time, splendid cities; but the quantity of land required to maintain the inhabitants of one great city, formed, in most cases, the whole territory of a Greek colony, from the beginning to the end of its career. Abundance and consequent cheapness of land, therefore, was not a cause of the rapid prosperity of the Greek Colonies. In the next place, high wages,—dearness of labour,—assuredly, had no part in their rapid advancement. For, besides that high wages could have arisen, only in the manner so well described by Dr. Smith, from superabundance of land, the Colonists carried with them, and obtained after their settlement, numbers of slaves, who were their principal cultivators and artizans. Lastly, it may be denied that the complete independence of a Colony from the beginning is by any means advantageous; for, however ill dependent colonies have been governed after they
had arrived at some importance, they have generally received nothing, in their first beginnings, but protection and assistance from the parent States under whose dominion they remained.

If these objections to the facts and reasoning of Dr. Smith are not unfounded, but two out of the five causes assigned by him can be admitted—knowledge of agriculture and other useful arts, and freedom from taxes. These, by themselves, are surely quite inadequate to the effects for which he endeavours to account. May not other causes be assigned?—I imagine four.

First.—The constitution of the emigrating body. The leaders of bodies of Emigrants from Greece were men of the highest distinction, whose fame, ability, and wealth enabled them to collect and transport a great number of followers, drawn from all ranks in the old State. Thus a body of Colonists formed, not a new society, in the common acceptation of the term, but an old society that had changed its abode. Secondly—The new abode was not an immense waste, without inhabitants, over which the Colonists might spread themselves, remaining for ages a scattered people, without that concentration in anything, which in every thing is the essence of power. Thirdly—The narrow limits of territory in proportion to people, together with the institution of slavery, rendered labour cheap instead of dear. Hence the profits of stock, to use a modern term, were large; wealth rapidly accu-
mulated; and it was easy for the new society to erect fine buildings,—to create very rapidly a city rivalling their parent city. Fourthly—As the portion of produce which falls to the land-owner, in modern language, rent, is small or great according as people are few or many in proportion to territory, and as the leaders of the new society were the owners of a limited territory, they possessed, either at once, or very soon, the riches and the consequent leisure, wherewith to cultivate "all the arts of refinement, philosophy, "poetry, and eloquence."

In the same chapter Dr. Smith endeavours to account for the less rapid progress of the American Colonies, in comparison with those of Greece, by dwelling on the evils of dependence; and he frequently repeats that settlers in America were enabled to prosper, in spite of dependence, by reason of the cheapness of land and dearness of labour, which advantages, he says, they possessed in a greater degree than Emigrants from Greece.

This doctrine may be submitted to the test of facts. The United States of North America have for some time enjoyed complete independence. Their inhabitants pay no tithes and but few taxes. Land may still be obtained almost as easily, and labour is still quite as dear, as when their States were founded. Their population equals, probably, that of Great Britain and Ireland at the time when Dr. Smith wrote. A constant influx of Emigrants from Europe, the
press, and great improvements in navigation, have placed at their disposal the accumulated, and always increasing, knowledge of the old world. Their soil is naturally fertile, and their climate is more favourable to varied production than that of Britain. Their mineral productions are little inferior to those of Britain. Their magnificent rivers afford natural means of communication infinitely superior to those of any European State; and the people are hardy, brave, active, intelligent, enterprising, and extremely ambitious.

According to Dr. Smith, therefore, they ought by this time to have rivalled at least, if not to have surpassed, their parent state in wealth and greatness. Yet, look at their condition. Their metropolis is not to be compared to many of the mere pleasure towns of England. Want of capital prevented the state of New York from commencing its great Canal from Lake Erie, until long after the profit of that undertaking had been demonstrated; and other States are now attempting to raise money in London, for great works, which cannot be undertaken unless capital be obtained from the parent country. In the useful arts, excepting only, perhaps, that of steam-navigation, they are far behind the parent country. Their manufactures, miserable at best, exist only through restrictive laws. If in the fine arts, there arise amongst them a man of ability, he hastens to Europe for patronage and profit. Their best writers live in France and England, because America offers no rewards for
success in literature. Their cleverest mechanics bring their skill to the rich market of Europe, because, in America, skill is less valuable than strength. Their boasted naval power is held as a mere boast by those, who know that they are positively unable to man as many ships as constitute a fleet. And all the arts of refinement, philosophy, poetry, and eloquence, are more largely and successfully cultivated in the seaport town of Liverpool, than throughout the extensive regions of North America. Thus the doctrine of Adam Smith concerning the effect of cheap land and dear labour, in producing national wealth and greatness, has been refuted by the safest of all arguments—an ample experiment. Doubtless, the people of America are laying a most extensive foundation of future wealth and greatness,—of a national greatness surpassing any that has occurred in the world. They are spreading over such extensive regions that, if they do but preserve their integrity, they must, whenever they cease to spread, acquire an unexampled degree of national wealth and power. But at present, and until they can no longer spread, they are, and must remain,—like children acquiring the means of knowledge by learning to read—an infant people, acquiring only the means of future wealth and greatness.

The operation of dearness of labour in preventing the accumulation of wealth may, I conceive, be readily traced. All the wealth that the world contains, is the accumulated produce of labour. Wealth,
therefore, is acquired by an excess of production over consumption, and its increase must be slow or rapid according to the degree of that excess. The gross produce of labour is shared between the capitalist and the labourer. When labour is little divided, that is, when it is dear, the gross produce is small; in other words, Division of labour is the soul of production. When labour is dear, the share of the labourer is great,—that of the capitalist small. It is the capitalist who accumulates; and when labour is dear, he obtains but a small share of a small quantity of produce. Thus dearness of labour hinders the accumulation of wealth. "The disproportion between the great extent of land, and the small number of people, which commonly takes place in new colonies," renders labourers scarce and wages high. In most new countries, in all where there is a great excess of land in proportion to the people, every man, more or less, supplies his own wants, and there is but little division of labour. It follows that, in new countries, production exceeds consumption in but a small degree, and that the accumulation of wealth is proportionally slow.

This view of the subject will be confirmed by reference to a fact that has often been noticed. The most wealthy and eminent men of North America, have been growers of tobacco. The cultivation of tobacco has been principally carried on in Virginia and Maryland, in which States abundance of slaves renders
labour comparatively cheap. Slave-labour employed in that cultivation is minutely divided, and the produce, consequently, is very great. As the owner of the land is also the owner of the labour, and of the capital which employs it, he takes the whole produce, except that small portion which maintains his slaves. He is able, therefore, rapidly to accumulate wealth. Possessing wealth, he has leisure to occupy himself with public objects; he obtains eminence in his own country, and, if his abilities are great, universal fame.

If in the States of Virginia and Maryland, slavery were abolished, the negroes would acquire property by their labour, and would gradually emigrate to the West, in search of waste land. Labour would then become as dear in those States, as it is now in states where slavery has been abolished; and the cultivation of tobacco would no longer be a more profitable employment of capital than the growth of wheat. In those states where slavery was never firmly established, cheapness of land and dearness of labour produced a substitute for slavery, under the puritanical name of "indentures." Indented labourers would, if the bond could be rigidly exacted, be to all intents, slaves; and kidnapping, so largely promoted by the founders of some of the American States, was literally a slave-trade in whites. The Americans are induced, by the facility with which land can be obtained by any but slaves, to preserve the institution of slavery; and it would not, I believe, be difficult to prove that
the excess of land and dearness of labour which commonly take place in new Colonies, were the sole causes of the revival of slavery. So great were felt to be the evils arising from excess of land in proportion to people, that, in order to mitigate them, another and greater evil was willingly, nay eagerly, incurred. If this be true, if those evils were so great as to call for so evil a mitigation, have not cheapness of land and dearness of labour greatly retarded, instead of greatly hastening the progress of new Colonies to wealth and greatness?

I have dwelt at tiresome length on Adam Smith’s doctrine as to the advantages of dear labour, because I would not pertly oppose so great an authority, whose opinions on this subject are generally received. But I must now state, that one main object of the proposed measure is to render land dear, and labour cheap, in all the Australian settlements—dear, and cheap, I mean, as compared with the usual price of land and rate of wages in new colonies. The end sought by such comparative dearness of land and cheapness of labour, is the greatest division of labour; the greatest production; the utmost excess of production over consumption; the greatest accumulation of wealth—in other words, the utmost prosperity of the colony—the greatest progress of colonization.

To illustrate the operation of Articles I. and II. in conjunction with Article III., let it be supposed that a hundred thousand acres of naturally fertile land should, by miracle, rise out of the sea on the coast
of Essex. Such land, being Crown property, would sell for a considerable price. Why? because it would yield a considerable rent. It would yield a considerable rent, because population, in the country of which it would form a part, is very dense. In this imagined case, the purchase-money of waste land would be retained by the Crown. In the proposed case, the purchase-money of waste land would be expended on emigration, that is to say, in thickening the colonial population, and giving to the land granted the same sort of value that land possesses in old countries. The purchaser of land, therefore, would pay, not for his title to the land, but for the value which his purchase-money would give to the land. He would pay for a valuable thing, instead of getting a valueless thing for nothing; and, in contemplating a purchase, he would be guided by his own calculation as to the degree of value, which the purchase-money of the thing would give to the thing bought.

He would say, "No one can obtain land in this colony for less than the price at which land is now offered to me. That is one reason in favour of purchasing. My purchase-money, and the purchase-money of all future grantees, will be expended in increasing the colonial population. This will soon cause my land to yield rent. Again, a tax of ten per cent upon the future rent, being anticipated (by Article IV.) and expended on emigration, I may expect that my land will soon yield a high rent. Moreover, if these measures do not provide for a degree of emigration,
sufficient to make my land yield a high rent, the purchase-money of future grants will be anticipated and expended for that purpose. On the whole, I had rather pay for land according to these regulations, than obtain land for nothing according to the old system."

Such, I imagine, would be the calculation of a speculator, unless, indeed, we can believe that Capitalists would consider 100,000$ yielding an interest of one per cent, more valuable than 50,000$ yielding an interest of five per cent. If I am not mistaken in this view of the subject, the investment of capital in the appropriation of waste land, according to the proposed measure, would be far more profitable than according to the present system. It would follow, that the proposed measure must operate, not as a check, but as a great encouragement to colonization.

For the execution of Article II. the mode of selling waste land in North America would furnish a useful model. Here, it is only needful to suggest, that surveys of waste land, divided into convenient allotments, each allotment comprising, as nearly as possible, equal quantities of the best, middling, and the worst land, should, at all times, be made in advance of the demand for grants; and, above all, that the persons charged with those surveys should be so chosen, paid, and controlled, as to be beyond the suspicion of jobbing or partiality.
That the proceeds of the tax upon rent, and of sales, form an *Emigration Fund*, to be employed in the conveyance of British Labourers to the Colony, free of cost.

This provision explains itself. I may remark, however, that, in conjunction with the other provisions, it would supply the desideratum, so anxiously but fruitlessly sought by the Parliamentary Emigration Committee; namely, a means of conducting the Emigration of paupers from Britain, without any expense to the country. The principle on which the recommendation of the Committee was founded, is, that the labour of paupers, removed from an old to a new country, would repay the cost of their removal. No doubt it would; but the measure proposed by the Committee provides *no security* for repayment. They suggest that Government shall advance to the Pauper Emigrant not only the cost of his passage, but also stock, implements, and food for a year; holding as security for repayment, the bit of forest or swamp on which he shall be located. The pauper, necessarily ignorant and imprudent, is to be converted, all at once, into a landowner, and under circumstances, which, above all others, require much intelligence and the greatest
prudence. He is not to be planted on a small grant, in the midst of rich, intelligent, and prudent Emigrants, whose example and assistance might lead him to profit by the great change in his condition; but thousands like him are to be planted in masses, and left entirely to their own guidance. His land, being in a country where land can be obtained for next to nothing, will possess no value, except according to the degree in which it shall be improved. The security of the Government, therefore, for the repayment of its advance, is the Emigrant's good fortune and good conduct. He will be subject to fever, and in a society so composed, to idleness, drunkenness, blunders, and despair; any one of which must prevent him from fulfilling the condition of his grant. Here then is an end of security, in the usual sense of the word. Moreover, the settler will be tempted, by the high wages of labour at no great distance, to sell his stock, quit his embarrassing estate, and return to his proper condition of a labourer for hire. Many attempts have been made both in America and in New South Wales, to settle paupers, in masses, isolated from capital, intelligence, and prudence. Such attempts at plantation have almost universally failed. The poor, ignorant, imprudent landowner has sunk under his troubles; his land has passed away to the dealer in rum; and, the wages of labour near him being very high, he has returned to his proper condition of a labourer for hire. Unquestionably the Emigration of Paupers, according
to the system proposed by the Committee, would greatly benefit the condition of the persons removed; but there is no security for repayment to Government of the expense incurred by their removal; and this country is not inclined to risk further taxation for any purpose, bad or good. These, I imagine, are the reasons why Mr. Wilmot Horton's benevolent plan has been received, by all parties with apathy, if not with dislike.

Recurring to the proposed measure, whatever the extent of Emigration for which it should provide, the whole would occur without any expense to this country. Emigration would be carried on by private speculation, not to the loss but to the advantage of those who should defray its expense. A part of that expense would be defrayed beforehand by the produce of rent-tax and sales; or, if that produce were anticipated, there would be ample security for repayment to those who should make the advance. The Emigrant labourer would not change his condition, except by living in plenty instead of misery; and he would not be called upon to exert qualities foreign to his habits and character. In short, as respects labourers, both those who should emigrate, and those who should remain at home, the operation of the proposed measure would be the same, as if, by miracle, a quantity of fertile land could be added every year to the territory of Britain, in due proportion to the increase of people. In that supposed case, the labourer, who
should remove to the new land, would obtain good wages; and his removal would raise the wages of labour on the old land. As the people increased, wages would fall; but, if more land were added, the same operation would be repeated. If, by the proposed measure, the extensive regions of Australasia be, as it were, connected with Britain, that is, if every grant of land in Australasia should cause a demand for labourers from Britain, and supply the cost of their removal, the operation of raising wages, by an addition of territory, may be repeated over and over again for ages to come. Or, rather, a desirable rate of wages may be constantly maintained, by a constant but gradual increase of territory. Volumes might be filled in attempting to point at the happy consequences, both at home and in the Colonies, of this presumed effect of the measure in question.

The Parliamentary Committee on Emigration have provided the machinery for executing all that part of the proposed measure which concerns the mere removal of the Emigrant from Britain to the Colony.

**Article IV.**

That those to whom the administration of the Fund shall be entrusted, be empowered to raise money thereon, as money is raised on parish and county rates in England.
An anticipation of the produce of rent-tax and sales, is suggested, with a view to give immediate and extensive effect to the proposed measure. As, lately, land has been granted in Australasia with the utmost profusion, a very great increase of people must occur, before much ungranted land would be sold for money, and before appropriated land would yield much rent. The utmost yearly produce of rent-tax and of sales, would not, perhaps, exceed 10,000 l. a year, for some years to come. At a cost of 20 l. for the passage of one person, that sum would convey only 500 Emigrants a year. But if money were raised at 5 per cent. on that fund, 200,000 l. might be immediately expended on emigration, and 10,000 persons might be at once conveyed to the different settlements. If all future rent-tax and sales were charged with the sum borrowed for the purposes of Emigration, the lender would see his capital employed in providing an ample security for the interest, and for ultimate repayment. For it is certain, that, if rent-tax and sales would yield 10,000 l. a year, without any foreign addition to the population, they would yield a great deal more, after an addition of 10,000 Emigrants. What would be the proportionate increase of the Emigration fund, I do not pretend to estimate; but something like a reasonable estimate of the increase of rent, at least, might be formed, by comparing the actual population with the number of acres actually granted, and by calculating an increase of rent in
proportion to an addition of 10,000 persons to the actual population. This calculation, it must be remarked, would not extend beyond the immediate increase of rent. A further increase, not to be calculated, would arise from the increase of people by births in the Colony. Here, however, the principle only requires notice—It is that common principle, which, in half the affairs of trade, induces men to mortgage their revenue, in order to increase it; and we owe nearly all great useful works to the operation of that principle.

**Article V.**

That the supply of Labourers be exactly proportioned to the demand for Labour at each Settlement, so that no Capitalist shall ever want Labourers, and no Labourer shall ever want employment.

The execution of this provision would require considerable intelligence and judgment in the persons to whom it might be confided. These, it is proposed, should be an Agent of Emigration at each Settlement. His duties would be,
First, To supply the Government at home with accurate information as to the state of demand for labourers in the Settlement; and according to his reports, the supply of Emigrants would be carefully regulated.

Secondly, To receive the Emigrants on their arrival, and to facilitate their being hired by Capitalists.

Thirdly, To furnish them with a very moderate provision until hired.

The first duty is the most important. In the infancy of the Settlement, the Agent might very accurately learn the state of demand for labour, by receiving applications from Capitalists, and keeping an exact registry of the same. Afterwards, as the Settlement should increase, and Capitalists should be far removed from the seat of Colonial Government, he must take great pains to collect true information, and to judge soundly.

There is a maximum as well as well as a minimum of wages. The minimum being the value of the smallest quantity of the produce of his labour, upon which the labourer can exist, the maximum is the largest share which the capitalist can, profitably, relinquish to the labourer. No one will labour for less than his bare subsistence, and none will employ labourers but for profit. Between the maximum and the minimum there are many gradations, governed by the proportion which labour bears to capital. But there are some countries in which the maximum, and
others in which the minimum, generally obtains. In Britain the common rate of wages is the minimum; and in North America the common rate of wages is the maximum. In Britain, however, many labourers cannot earn even the minimum, and they are either starved or maintained in idleness;—whilst, in America, there is often an absolute want of labourers, even at the maximum. After the State of New York had raised a fund sufficient for the completion of its canal, calculating the cost at the ordinary high rate of wages, it could not proceed till it obtained a great importation of Irish labourers. Again, when the pay of seamen in the American navy exceeded the maximum of wages in the merchant service, the naval demand, even for landsmen, was still unsupplied. So, at this moment, in Australasia, there is, notwithstanding the supply of cheap labour afforded by convicts, an unsupplied demand for labourers at the maximum. Take, for example, the case of settlers in Van Dieman's Land, where as many as five thousand sheep sometimes, and two thousand commonly, are allowed to run in one flock, male and female, young and old, weak and strong, all mixed together. The loss, in consequence, is immense. That loss would be wholly prevented by the employment of more shepherds; and, any one capable of estimating the loss, will acknowledge that the gain would afford ample wages to the additional shepherds, besides leaving a large additional profit to their employer. But though
these high wages are there going a begging, as it were, there are not labourers to take them. The case of the Australian Company furnishes another example. One source of expected profit mentioned by their prospectus, is "the production, at a more distant time, of wine, olive-oil, hemp, flax, silk, opium, &c." But why "at a more distant time?" Not because the Company wants capital for any very profitable employment—not because the cultivation of those articles, in a climate so agreeable to them, and on picked land, would be otherwise than most profitable to the capitalist,—but simply, because, for any such purposes, which require the employment of much labour, there is an absolute want of labourers, even at the most extravagant wages.

This unsupplied demand for labour at high wages exists in most new countries. But Australasia promises to furnish a demand for labour at high wages to a greater extent than most new countries, for this very important reason. In most new countries, waste land does not produce till after a great expense of labour not immediately productive, that is, labour in clearing forests, draining marshes, building sheds for cattle, &c. —whereas in Australasia a warm and dry climate enable the farmer to breed cattle almost without buildings, and nature has, to a great extent, cleared and drained the land for him. Thus he may direct the greater part of his capital to immediate production; and of course, as the first labour employed by him is imme-
mediately productive, the employment of labour enables him immediately to employ more labour. Whereas, on new land in America, the settler cannot employ productive labour till he has employed a great deal of what may be called unproductive labour. His demand for labour therefore increases slowly. In Australasia, as compared with the new settlements of America, nature has provided capital for the settler; and it is a mere truism to say that the demand for labour must always be in proportion to the quantity of capital.

Supposing the present demand for labour at high wages to be supplied, the supply would create a fresh demand. The Capitalist, supplied with the means of rapidly increasing the capital provided for him by nature, would soon have more employment for labour; and the labourer, obtaining high wages, would, if industrious and careful, acquire capital, wherewith to demand and employ other labourers. This process of demand causing supply, and supply creating fresh demand, would, I imagine, continue until the pressure of population upon land should occasion a demand for more land. The appropriation of more land would occasion a fresh demand for labour; and the whole process would be repeated, or rather, would be in continual operation, until all the waste land of Australasia should be appropriated and cultivated.
ARTICLE VI.

That, in the selection of Emigrants, an absolute preference be given to equal numbers of both sexes, and to persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four.

The proposed selection of Emigrants would, it appears to me, be easy, just, and politic;—easy, because persons of that age would most readily make the venture of Emigration;—just, because it would prevent the many evils attendant on the disproportion between the sexes, which has hitherto marked the beginnings of all modern Colonies;—and politic, because in the same degree that the Emigration of young persons only, must, more than that of persons of all ages, cause a very rapid increase of people in the Colony, would it, exactly, check the increase of people in Britain, more than would the Emigration of persons of all ages.

To this last point, I beg particular attention. Referring to the questions already considered, the success of the whole measure would depend upon the rate at which the Colonial population should increase. According to that increase would be the increase of rent and sales,—of the means for defray-
ing the cost of past, and of future, Emigration. The greatest possible increase of Colonial population would, therefore, be the most desirable.

A thousand Emigrants of all ages might not, at the end of twenty years, increase the Colonial population by more than that number. As many might die as would be born, and, if there were an excess of males, the number might, at the end of twenty years, be much less than a thousand. But five hundred young couples, supposing that each couple rears six children, and that in twenty years, half of the original Emigrants be dead, would, in that short period, increase the Colonial population by three thousand five hundred souls. Any number of Emigrants, in short, would, if selected as proposed, treble themselves in the first twenty years. Whereas, I must repeat, a number of Emigrants of all ages might not, and probably would not, begin to increase till the end of twenty years.

Now the cost of conveying one thousand Emigrants would be, I have supposed, 20,000l. That sum, increasing for twenty years at compound interest of 5 per cent. would be 53,000l. Supposing one thousand Emigrants of all ages to be conveyed in the year 1830, the cost of increasing the Colonial population by a thousand souls, in the year 1850, would be 53,000l. Whereas, if young couples only were selected, an increase of a thousand souls would be obtained, in 1850, by the Emigration in 1830, of
three hundred persons, at a cost, allowing compound interest of 5 per cent. for twenty years, of 16,000£.

This is an extreme calculation; but it is offered only to illustrate a principle. By adopting that principle in the conduct of Emigration, I am inclined to think, that, in conjunction with the rest of the proposed measure, the Crown might eventually sell land in Australia for as high a price as could be obtained for fertile land, rising miraculously out of the sea, close to Britain.

*Article VII.*

That every person reaching a Settlement at his own expense, or providing a passage for others, be entitled to a grant of land at the rate of Acres for himself and for each person by him conveyed to the Settlement.

The object of this regulation is to encourage the settlement of persons, who, though not rich, might be unwilling to accept a free passage for themselves and families. It would not at all interfere with general principles, on which the whole measure is founded. The quantity of land allowed for each person would be at the rate of one acre for every 2l. of the ordinary cost of one person’s passage.
ARTICLE VIII.

That every person reaching a Settlement at his own expense, or providing a passage for others, have the option to receive, either a grant of land as by Article VII., or a payment in money from the Emigration Fund, at the rate of 2l. per acre for the quantity of land to which he should be entitled.

The object of this regulation is to enable Capitalists to obtain labourers accustomed to any particular kind of cultivation. It would not at all interfere with the general principles on which the whole measure is founded. Perhaps, with a view to the cultivation of tobacco, silk, wine, &c. the same allowance should be made for Emigrants brought from foreign countries. But that allowance should be strictly confined to Capitalists, engaging to employ the foreign Emigrants, by them brought to the Colony. Otherwise people would speculate on the Emigration Fund, by claiming, for Emigrants from India and China, the cost of Emigrants from Britain.
ARTICLE IX.

That Grants be absolute in fee, without any condition whatsoever, and obtainable by deputy.

The other regulations of the proposed measure would obviate the necessity for conditions. All the conditions at present attached to grants of colonial land are intended to prevent the misappropriation and neglect of land. They have entirely failed of their object. But that object would be obtained, in the most simple and certain manner, by the proposed measure. As the supply of labourers would always be in proportion to the land granted, the grantee, if he did not let his land, would surely cultivate it. It cannot be doubted that, at present, grantees of waste land wish to fulfil the conditions of their grants. To do so would be for their own advantage; but the dearness of labour,—the absolute want of labourers,—prevents them from doing so. In the proposed case, the grantee would have the power to consult his own advantage, by cultivating his land. It is for this that he would pay, when appearing to pay for his title to the land; and he would no more neglect to use that power than a hungry man would neglect to eat food presented to him. It seems, there-
fore, quite unnecessary to bind him to do that, which every man in his situation would be sure to do without any bond. If this view of the subject be correct, it furnishes a strong argument in favour of the whole measure. The Governments of all new Colonies have followed the principle of checking the misappropriation of land, and have hitherto universally failed in their attempts to give effect to that principle. The proposed measure, it is conceived, would at once give complete effect to that excellent principle, by securing what alone has been sought by the conditions attached to grants.

That grants should be obtainable by deputy, that is, without emigration, is recommended with a view to treat colonial land as much as possible like land that should, miraculously, rise out of the sea close to Britain. In the imagined case, the purchaser of land would not be compelled to reside on his grant. Whether or not he should reside on his grant would be wholly unimportant, with a view to the effect of an increase of territory in causing a decrease of pauperism. So in the proposed case, the Grantee, even though he should never quit London, could not misappropriate land. His purchase-money would be employed in augmenting the Colonial population, in proportion to the extent of his grant. His land therefore would yield rent; and of course it would be cultivated, though not by him.

If this conclusion is reasonable, it is much to be
desired that grants should be obtainable without Emigration. The whole object of the proposed measure is to diminish the evils of pauperism in Britain, and to promote Colonization, by rendering the purchase of waste land a very profitable employment of capital. The greater the quantity of land purchased, the more gratifying would be the results of the proposed measure. Consequently the purchase of waste land should be encouraged as much, and checked as little, as possible. An obligation to emigrate would be a serious check. If there were no such obligation, much British capital might be invested in the purchase of Colonial land. Such a mode of investment would be peculiarly eligible for properties intended to accumulate, and would, I cannot but think, be preferable to any investment in reversionary property. Every argument, at least, which favours the presumption that the whole measure would cause a rapid advance in the rent of land, is an argument also in favour of such investments. For the increase of rent is an increase of market value; and if the increase were rapid, such investments would be a very profitable employment of money. London Capitalists would require no other encouragement to assist in giving effect to the proposed system of Colonial Policy.
ARTICLE X.

That any surplus of the proceeds of the tax upon rent, and of sales, over what is required for Emigration, be employed in relief of other taxes, and for the general purposes of Colonial Government.

"If a body of people were to migrate into a new country, and land had not yet become private property, there would be this reason for considering the rent of land, as a source peculiarly adapted to supply the exigencies of the Government; that industry would not, by that means, sustain the smallest repression; and that the expense of the Government would be defrayed without imposing any burthen upon any individual. The owners of capital would enjoy its profits; the class of labourers would enjoy their wages, without any deduction whatsoever; and every man would employ his capital in the way which was really most advantageous, without any inducement from the mischievous operation of a tax, to remove it from a channel, in which it was more, to one in which it would be less, productive to the nation. There is, therefore,
"a peculiar advantage in reserving the rent of land, "as a fund for supplying the exigencies of the State."*

All the expense of the measure itself, that is, the whole cost of surveys, of the collection of rent-tax, and of Emigration, would, of course, be at once defrayed by the proceeds of rent-tax and sales. The utmost economy of administration, would be indispensable to the success of the measure; and especially that economy, which would devote as much as possible to the mere passage of Emigrants, and as little as possible to the salaries of officers. Perhaps, the surplus of the fund produced by rent-tax and sales, over what would be required to maintain a constant supply of labour in proportion to the demand, would, at times, be very considerable. Such surplus might properly be employed in the construction of roads, bridges, canals, docks, or other public works, having a tendency to increase production and consumption, that is, to raise the rent of land. Perhaps also that surplus might be sufficiently great to defray a part, or even the whole, of the expense of Colonial Government. Ultimately,—as soon as the demand for Emigration should cease—the tax upon rent would amply provide for any conceivable expense of Government.

I have estimated the cost of passage for one person at 20l. At this time any number of poor Emigrants might be conveyed to Australasia at an average

* Mill's Political Economy.
cost of 25s. each. But one operation of the proposed measure would be to lessen the cost of passage. A pipe of wine may, it is said, be sent from the Thames to the Ganges, at less cost than from the Docks to St. James's. Because, probably, our imports from India are, for the most part, raw produce, whilst our exports thereto are manufactures and money. The whole of the imports and the whole of the exports must be of equal value; but the former occupy much more tonnage than the latter. Whence it happens, that ships, not unfrequently, proceed to India in ballast. May one not conclude that a similar difference would occur in our trade with Australasia, whenever a plentiful supply of labourers should lead to the production of raw materials to be exchanged for the manufactures of Britain? If so, the cost of emigration would soon be lower than at first. As the cost of emigration should decrease, the surplus produce of rent-tax and sales would increase.
GENERAL REMARKS.

1. It is suggested that this mode of disposing of waste land should be rendered permanent by an act of the Legislature. Because, without the best security for its permanence, capitalists would not, to any great extent, either purchase waste land, or advance money on the future proceeds of rent-tax and sales.

2. To operate effectually, this mode of disposing of waste land should be adopted in all the settlements of Australasia, actual and future. Otherwise the capitalists of a settlement where land might be obtained for nothing, would, in order to supply their consequent want of labourers, entice away the labourers of other settlements, where land had been obtained by payment; and the purchasers of land would thereby be cheated of their consideration.

3. The measure could not be applied to Canada. Because the vicinity of the United States would induce emigrant labourers to emigrate once more in search of waste land, or extravagant wages; and the purchasers of waste land in Canada, would thereby be cheated of their consideration. It might however be applied to the Cape of Good Hope as easily, perhaps, though not so effectually, as to the Australasian settlements. It appears peculiarly adapted to Australasia: in the first place, because, in that country, the acquisition of land at no great distance from the sea, might proceed for ages
to come; and the cost of transport, both for Emigrants and for produce, would be much less than in a country, where colonization could proceed only at a great distance from the sea: secondly, because the profit on the employment of capital in colonization would depend on the increase of people; and in Australasia the absence of those diseases which afflict other new countries, and of many diseases which are fatal to children in Europe, would permit an unexampled excess of births over deaths: thirdly, because the Australasian settlements are yet in their infancy; no uniform system of granting land has yet been established in them; and an uniform system might be established there without injury to any existing class of persons.

4. I cannot discover any class of persons whose vested rights, or other interests would be injuriously affected by the measure. The actual grantees of land, whom, at first sight, it would appear to tax, are exactly the class of persons that would gain the most by it. As waste land would no longer be obtainable but by payment of 2l. per acre, their land must very soon possess that market value, at least; and the tax upon rent, not being a land tax, would take from them only a tenth part of what, in most cases, the tax itself would first bestow.

5. It would be in accordance with the principles on which the suggested measure is founded, to allow the occupation of Crown land, for grazing; as such occupation is now usefully permitted in New South
but they seem at least worthy of examination. In truth, they have been recognized by Government in a late regulation for granting land in Western Australia. If the condition on which two hundred acres of waste land can be obtained at the Swan River settlement, by the conveyance of one labourer from Britain, were made imperative,—that is, if no land could be obtained otherwise than by the conveyance of emigrant labourers,—and if the number of acres allowed for each person were very much diminished, the same results as are proposed by this measure would be obtained, though at a later time and to a less extent. Numerous other methods of giving operation to the principles in question might be suggested. I have selected, from amongst several other methods, that which, after much reflection, appears to me to be the best. But I offer it as a mere sketch of what might be effected. To suggest to the existing Government a measure professedly complete in all its parts, would be an act of great presumption in any individual. For the Government alone, by its information, power, and responsibility, is qualified to frame a complete measure; and, happily, the existing Government does not shrink from the task of performing those functions which properly belong, not to individuals, but to Government.

THE END.

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